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1. Data {#sec1}
=======

The data contains observations from an incentivized GSP auction experiment, conducted in the Ohio State University between March 2017 and April 2017. 108 subjects were recruited through ORSEE [@bib6] and asked to submit bids in a sequence of GSP auctions, which were computerized, programmed using z-tree [@bib4]. The subjects were incentivized to submit bids to (in expectation) maximize the profit in the GSP auctions as we paid cash proportional to the profit earned in the experiment.

The experiment simulated GSP auctions where three bidders compete for two advertisement-slots. A 2 by 2 experiment design was employed, varying click-through rates (CTRs) of the two ad-slots and the information about other bidders\' value per click. In the high-ratio treatment (11-10), the CTRs of the two slots are close to each other in that the first slot gets 11 clicks and the second slot gets 10 clicks. In the low-ratio treatment (11-3), the CTRs are relatively far apart, 11 clicks for the first slot and 3 for the second. Both 11-10 and 11-3 treatments were conducted under static complete information and dynamic incomplete information settings. The static complete information setting follows the leading theories\' assumptions [@bib3], [@bib9] while the dynamic incomplete information setting is closer in structure to how GSP auctions are conducted in practice. In the static complete information setting, all bidders know other bidders\' values and participate in one-shot GSP auction while in the dynamic incomplete information setting, bidders do not know other bidders\' values and participated in repeated GSP auctions. [Fig. 1](#fig1){ref-type="fig"} show a sample data description of this dataset.Fig. 1Bid plots under 11-3 and 11-10 treatments (static complete information).Fig. 1

2. Experimental design, materials and methods {#sec2}
=============================================

Total 6 sessions of experiment conducted, three sessions with 11-3 treatments and the other three with 11-10 treatment (see [Table 1](#tbl1){ref-type="table"}). Each experimental session started with 10 static complete information (SC) auctions, with new values randomly drawn from the interval \[1, 100\] in each auction.[1](#fn1){ref-type="fn"} These were followed by 8 dynamic incomplete information (DI) auctions with 10 rounds per auction, with new values randomly drawn from the interval \[1, 100\]. CTRs remained the same in each experimental session -- 11-3 or 11-10. Instructions for the SC and DI parts were read separately prior to the start of the treatment in question. Subjects were randomly reassigned to three-person groups prior to the start of each auction.Table 1Overview of the dataset.Table 1Session NumberFile nameTreatmentNumber of ParticipantsSession 1170327_141711-324Session 2170403_131111-1024Session 3170418_105711-312Session 4170419_112511-1015Session 5170418_154711-318Session 6170419_150511-1015
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These draws, done in advance, were repeated until three values (v^1^, v^2^, v^3^) satisfied the ratio $0.57 < \frac{v^{1} - v^{2}}{v^{2} - v^{3}} < 0.59$ , where (v^1^, v^2^, v^3^) means the highest, the second highest and the lowest values per click. For more details, refer to Bae and Kagel [@bib1].

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dib.2019.104469>.
